One of the reasons professional football has so many fans worldwide and attracts so mae talents is not just because of money and fame, it's because it is the closest thing to war iime.

  And war always stirs passion and fearlessness.

  In the 1990s, Ferguson led his all-quering Red Devils, dominating the Premier League and winning three league titles in four years. With stars like tona and the Css of '92, Maer United's ambition stretched beyond domestic success.

  The Champions League.

  For any club aiming to build a dynasty, this was the ultimate proving ground.

  But in 1996, a Fren named Wenger arrived at Highbury.

  At first, Ferguson paid him little attention. Wenger wasn't even on his radar. But that season, he led Arsenal to a third-pce finish in the league, f Ferguson to take notice.

  That same year, Maer United secured their fourth league title in five seasons.

  A year ter, Wenger respouson's initial indifference by leading Arsenal to a league and FA Cup double.

  The reigning king suddenly realized that before he could quer Europe, a new challenger had already emerged in his own backyard. Armed, he made a decisive move, spending big t Dwight Yorke from Aston Vil.

  With Yorke and Cole f the legendary "Bck Wind Duo," Maer United reached new heights.

  That season, they achieved the unpreted treble—Premier League, FA Cup, and Champions League—marking the beginning of another era of domih three secutive league titles.

  But dynasties rarely fall because of external threats. The real cracks always form from within.

  As Ferguso his sights on another Champions League title, his two most troublesome pyers deed rapidly. This forced him to rethink his pns and front the growing issues within the squad.

  With a legendary midfield of Giggs, Scholes, Beckham, and Keane, Maer United could sistently create ces. But what they cked was a true goal mae, someone who could reliably finish those ces.

  And so, Ferguson was willing to wait aire year to secure Ruud van Nistelrooy from PSV Eindhoven.

  At the same time, however, another problem was brewing—Beckham.

  His growing presen the tabloids set off arm bells for Ferguson.

  The veteran manager had seen too many rising stars in English football lose their way due to distras off the pitch, Gase, tona, Yorke and Cole… He didn't want Beckham, whom he had nurtured like a son, to follow the same path.

  But he fot, Beckham wasn't his son. And even if he were, sons don't always listen.

  The infamous flying boot i in the dressing room sent shockwaves through the club, and before long, Beckham was on his way to Spain.

  Without Beckham's pinpoint long passes, United lost one of their most lethal attag ons. The once perfectly banced midfield was suddenly thrown into disarray.

  To make matters worse, after losing Beckham, Maer United failed to sign Ronaldinho, who chose Bara instead.

  That failed transfer was a crushing blow.

  In the summer of 2003, United signed Cristiano Ronaldo and handed him the iio. 7 shirt. Many believed he was brought in as Beckham's rept.

  But in professional football, there is no such thing as a direct rept.

  No two pyers are ever truly alike.

  Meanwhile, Chelsea's rapid rise under Roman Abramovich presented a hreat. For the first time in Premier League history, Maer United went twht seasons without winning the title.

  Backed by unmatched financial power, Mourinho quickly built Chelsea into a formidable force, seemingly ready to dethrone United aablish a new dynasty.

  To make matters worse, the departure of Roy Kea a massive void in Maer United's midfield.

  During the 2006 World Cup, the world was captivated by Zidane's infamous headbutt, Italy's triumph, and the Calciopoli sdal. But behind the ses, Ferguson made a decision that would shape the era of Maer United.

  At a time when Ronaldo ubliemy number one in Engnd, Ferguson personally intervened, ving the young Puese star to stay.

  He made one promise—he would build the great Maer Ueam around him.

  Who is the true core of the team? It's not just about saying it out loud. It's not as simple as giving Ronaldo unlimited shooting privileges or making him the highest-paid pyer in the squad. It has to be reflected in tactics, in his status within the locker room, and in every aspect of the team's setup.

  On a tactical level, the sale of Van Nistelrooy fually ged Maer United's approach to advang the ball. Instead of relying on their midfield to dictate py, they began using a forward droppio pensate for the midfield's ck of vertical passing ability.

  One major advantage of this system was that it forced defenders, sometimes even a holding midfielder, to step forward, creating gaps in the back lihat was exactly what Ronaldo needed. With his exceptional off-the-ball movement, boundless energy, and blistering speed, he could make diagonal runs into the space left behind, hitting those gaps at full pace to gee sg ces.

  Ferguson had beeiculously preparing for this tactical shift. From Rooney's transformation to the use of pyers like Saha, An Smith, Berbatov, and Tevez, every move was based on the same principle.

  The eructure revolved around Ronaldo.

  And the Puese forward did not disappoint. While his finishing wasn't always ical, United created an abundance of ces, and goal after goal propelled them back to the summit of European football. They won both the Premier League and the Champions League.

  This was the Ferguson-led Maer Uhat Gao Shen reparing to face.

  Ever since reag the Champions League semifinals, Gao Shen and his coag staff had been analyzing Maer United day and night.

  Every evening, he would immerse himself iactical library, disseg Ferguson's strategies and searg for weaknesses.

  What he found was revealing—Ferguson wasn't fully satisfied with his current squad.

  There had been persistent rumors that he wa Wesley Sneijder from Real Madrid to repce Scholes. However, based on tactical insights, Gao Shen was vihat Sneijder wasn't Ferguson's real target.

  What he truly wanted was Karim Benzema from Lyon.

  Ferguson valued Benzema so highly that he was even prepared to let Cristiano Ronaldo leave.

  While Ronaldo was the focal point of United's attack, he wasn't the foundation of their tactical setup. His role rimarily to instill fear in oppos and deliver goals. But in football, goals aren't a guarahey have to be created.

  And in that text, shaping the enviroo gee goals was even more important than the goal itself.

  United's tactical framework depended on forwards dropping deep, but only one pyer had truly mastered the role—Rooney.

  Tevez brought relentless energy and fighting spirit, but his ability to drop back, receive the ball, and distribute it effectively was g. Berbatov, oher hand, had exceptional teique, great hold-up py, and precise passing, but he simply didn't run enough.

  United's eag system thrived on fluid movement and stant rotation, aov's obility often disrupted the team's rhythm.

  At present, among United's forwards, only Rooney fully met Ferguson's expectations.

  Benzema, the rising star at Lyon, was a geional talent.

  Like Rooney, he t at dropping deep, receiving the ball with his back to goal, and linking py. His first toud passing were superb, and he rarely lost possession iag third. The key difference? Benzema was also a ical finisher.

  Simply put, he was both a tactical forward and a pure goal scorer.

  That's why Ferguson had been trag Benzema since his emergence, determi him to Old Trafford and pair him with Rooney as the future of United's attack.

  He was even prepared to part ways with Ronaldo if necessary.

  After s through Ferguson's tactical philosophy, Gao Shehat many things had beuch clearer.

  "I'm almost certain that Ferguson will start with Ronaldo up front, Rooney on the left, and Park Ji-sung on the right. He promised Park that if he performed well, he'd get a ce to py in the Champions League final."

  In the coag office, after Gao Shen finished speaking, Zidane wrote down United's likely starting lineup oactical board, arranging them in their usual 4-3-3 formation.

  "There are two key pyers we o shut down defensively. One is Rooney. His ability to receive and distribute the ball iag third is crucial. The momes possession, we have to immediately cut off his passing nes."

  As he spoke, Gao Shen turo the board and circled Rakitic, who occupied the right side of Napoli's three-man midfield.

  "So in this game, Ivan's role will be critical. The sed Rooney gets the ball, he o close him down and deny him time and space. We 't let him pick out passes fortably."

  "If we shut down Rooney's passing options, United will only have oernative route to transition from midfield to attack."

  Gao Shen turned and spped his hand against Carrick's name on the board.

  Carrick's passing ability, particurly his le distribution, was a major on but only when he was given time to operate.

  People often referred to him as the 'Pirlo of the Premier League,' but the key word there wasn't Pirlo—it remier League.

  No one seriously thinks an NMG pop singer is the same as Louis Kht?

  S Carrick wasn't actually that difficult. The key was to apply stant pressure. If he wasn't given space, his passing range would be severely limited. Unlike Pirlo, he wasn't a deep-lying pymaker who could sistently break defensive lines with forasses. Instead, he was more of a distributor, keeping possession moving rather than slig defenses apart.

  If United's midfield had a natural pymaker who could sistently advahe ball, Ferguson wouldn't have o adapt his system by dropping forwards deep. He would have simply relied on a Van Nistelrooy-style striker to finish ces like in the early 2000s.

  "Our training sessions leading up to the game will focus owo key areas. Our primary goal is to keep United from sg in the first leg."

  In a Champions League semifinal, seg a sheet at home was a result they could work with.

  More importantly, Gao Shen wao use this first leg to test his theories on Maer Uo see if his tactical analysis held up under real match ditions.

  After all, what he studied iactical library still o be proven och.